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Good Bad Press: Observations and Speculations
About Internal Revenue Service Accountant-
Informants
"[Y]eah, I'm the taxman.
And you're working for no one but me."
THE BEATLES, Taunan, on REVOLVER (EMI Records 1966).
I. CHECKMATE, ACCOUNTANT TO TWO MASTERS
It was February, 1982. In the course of his duties Eagle, an Internal
Revenue Service agent, heard from an informant named Magpie. According to
Magpie, a St. Louis restauranteur, Rook, was moonlighting as a magician: he
was making gross income disappear.1
Eagle eyed Rook's returns. They had been prepared by Checkmate,2 a
Missouri-licensed certified public accountant. Checkmate had once helped
Eagle by spilling the beans on some nefarious tax shelter promoters.3 Since
then, Eagle had known Checkmate by the cryptic code name "controlled
informant number 43,111." 4
In May 1982, Eagle rendezvoused with Checkmate to make a payoff for
promoter information. The thrifty Eagle seized the opportunity to pump
Checkmate for some information on revenue-skimming in the local restaurant
industry. At first, Checkmate refused to talk. Later, however, he cracked,
grudgingly admitting that he had prepared returns for Rook.5
Rook had been a fertile source of carrots for Checkmate, paying him over
fifty thousand dollars for preparing returns and handling business records
throughout the 1980s. 6 But Checkmate feared the big stick of the Internal
I As the reader may surmise, "Eagle," "Magpie," and "Rook" are aliases used for
expository purposes. For the true identities of Eagle and Rook, see Tim Bryant, A Private
Accountant? CPA Helps IRS Gain Evidence Against Client, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, June
12, 1989, at lB.
2 "Checkmate" is also an alias. See i. H-is real-life counterpart is now deceased. See
William L. Raby, An Absence of Privilege-The Big QUill?, 53 TAX NOTES 451, 451 (Oct.
28, 1991).
3 Bryant, supra note 1. Checkmate was ultimately paid for his help, but his cooperation
with the Service was motivated less by bounty than by a federal tax lien: Checkmate was
delinquent in his taxes some $20,000. Id.4Id.
Sld.6 Id.
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Revenue Service; even though he was representing Rook in a civil tax audit, 7
Checkmate began feeding information about Rook's finances to the open-
mouthed Eagle.8 By conveying this information, Checkmate violated both rules
of professional conduct and state law. 9
After hearing Checkmate's pilfered information, a federal grand jury
indicted Rook on charges of income tax evasion and signing false corporate tax
returms. 10 Eagle's victory, however, took flight: despite winning a ruling that
Missouri's accountant-client privilege statute could not be used to suppress the
incriminating evidence,11 attorneys for the Department of Justice, following a
stem rebuke from the magistrate, unexpectedly dropped the case.12 The
outcome for Checkmate was hardly better. For his valiant efforts on behalf of
the United States Treasury, state authorities stripped him of his license to
practice public accounting. 13
The preceding tale of the "IRS rat fink" exploded across the front page of
the Wall Street Journal in February of 1990.14 The Journal's editors, sensing
an opportunity, undoubtedly believed their coverage would cause accountants
and lawyers, respectively, to perspire and salivate. Their beliefs were
vindicated; the story reached, and raised the pulse of, many people. The story
reached the issues, however, tangentially if at all. It focused so sharply on the
deception that it missed the background: another hard policy choice between
anarchy and the police-state. The government cannot operate without an
effectively enforced tax system, but Americans abhor overzealous law
7 Certified public accountants may practice before the Internal Revenue Service. See
MICHAEL L SALTZMAN, IRS PRcrIcn AND PROCEDURE 1-61 (1981).
8 Bryant, supra note 1.
9 See infra notes 22, 25 and accompanying text.
10 Lee Berton, Tax Nightmares: IRS Target Finds His Accountant Was U.S. Mole,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1990, at Al; Tim Bryant, Owsterfield Man Charged in Tax Case,
ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, Mar. 15, 1989, at 7B.
I1 Tim Bryant, U.S. Magistrate Denies Bid For Confidentiality, ST. Louis POST
DISPATCH, Jan. 25, 1990, at I1A.
12 Milo Geyelan and Ellen Joan Pollack, U.S. Drops Accountant-Infonmant Case,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 1991, at B6; Tim Bryant, U.S. Drops Case Built on Accountant-
Informant, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, Nov. 23, 1991, at 4B. The magistrate was angry
because the indictments had been procured without either the grand jury or the agents'
supervisors being informed of the role played by Checkmate. State ates Accountant for
Helping RS, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, Mar. 11, 1990, at 7D; see also infra notes 57, 60.
13 Geyelan and Pollack, supra note 12. Checkmate did not fight the action to remove
his license. At 74 years of age and prepared to retire, he could not justify expenditures to
save an unnecessary credential. Tim Bryant, CPA Who Informed IRS Faces Penalty, ST.
LOUIS POST DISPATCH, June 5, 1990, at 3A.
14 See Berton, supra note 10.
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enforcement and place a premium on privacy, which the law shields in varying
degrees.
Admittedly having joined the Journal in exploiting reader interest in tales
of criminal intrigue, betrayal, and law enforcement, this Note will attempt to
provide a better understanding of the Service's current and likely future use of
accountant-informants. This analysis will not purport to be "the final word,"
for the investigatory methods of the Service are shrouded in secrecy and there
is little data available on the Service's use of accountant-informants. It may
serve, however, to dispel the Journal's suggestion that the Service has launched
a major attack on fiduciary relationships.
This Note will proceed by reviewing the law of accountant-client privilege
and its treatment in criminal tax prosecutions. It will then discuss the Service's
use of informants in criminal tax investigations and the importance of the Rook
case, apparently the first case to confront the existence of accountant-
informants. 15 "Evading" the issues of whether and how accountant-client
communications should be privileged,'16 this Note will then discuss the use and
likely future of the accountant-informant. An examination of supposed "direct"
legal limitations on the use of accountant-informants will reveal that such
limitations are, for the most part, illusory. An examination of hypothesized
"indirect" limitations, however, will suggest that there are significant barriers
to expanding the use of accountant-informants. Thus, this Note will conclude
that, because there is little reason to believe Congress will intervene to prevent
their use, the Service will continue to use accountant-informants in modest
number. While not startling, this conclusion serves as a foil for the
sensationalism of the Journal and suggests a simple, if counterintuitive, point:
the Service often benefits from "bad press."
II. ACCOUNTANT-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The Rook case came under media scrutiny not only because it involved the
subterfuge of a fiduciary, but also because the magistrate hearing the case
refused to recognize a statutory accountant-client privilege defense. The nature
15 The Service seems to have utilized accountants in other contexts. See, e.g., United
States v. Will, 671 F.2d 963, 967 (6th Cir. 1982) (CPA permitted IRS agent to microfilm
client files); see also In re Impounded Case (Law Firm), 840 F.2d 196, 198 (3d Cir. 1988)
(special agent based probable cause on information received from former law firm
accountant). These cases, however, have not addressed the accountant-informant issue
directly.
16 On this topic see, for example, Scott L. Kline, Note, United States v. Arthur Young
& Co.: Judicial Death Knell for Auditors' Priilege and Suggested Congressional
Resurrection, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 694 (1986) (arguing for legislatively-created auditor
privilege for tax accrual workpapers to benefit securities registration system).
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of the accountant-client privilege, and its treatment in the federal courts, is
discussed below.
A. Testimonial and Lesser Privileges Under Statute
The only privileged relationships recognized at common law were the
attorney-client and husband-wife relationships.17 Twenty-three states and the
territory of Puerto Rico, however, have enacted statutes creating various forms
of an accountant-client privilege. 18 Some commentators suggest that these
statutes were enacted merely to lend dignity to the accounting profession.19
Others suggest that the privilege is justified by a right to privacy, or because
the privilege will promote more effective professional services. 20
Nine of the twenty-four accountant-client privilege statutes create
exceptions to the privilege for disclosure in judicial proceedings. 21 To this
extent, these nine statutes do little more than codify a professional ethics rle,22
17 See 8 JoHN H. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw §§ 2290, 2332
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
18 Denzil Causey & Frances McNair, An Analysis of State Accountant-Client Pdvilege
Statutes and Public Policy Implicationsfor the Accountant-Cient Relationship, 27 AM. Bus.
L.L 535,538 (1990).
19 Id at 546-48.
20 l at 547 (citing Thomas G. Krattenmacker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal
Courts-Alternative to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEo. L.. 61, 85-86
(1973)).
21 See Causey & McNair, supra note 18, at 538.22 Id. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has provided that:
A member in public practice shall not disclose any confidential client information
without the specific consent of the client. This rule shall not be construed ... (2) to
affect in any way the member's obligation to comply with a validly issued and
enforceable subpoena or summons, (3) to prohibit review of a member's professional
practice under AICPA or state CPA society authorization, or (4) to preclude a member
from initiating a complaint with or responding to any inquiry made by a recognized
investigative or disciplinary body. Members of a recognized investigative or
disciplinary body and professional practice reviewers shall not use to their own
advantage or disclose any member's confidential client information that comes to their
attention in carrying out their official responsibilities. However, this prohibition shall
not restrict the exchange of information with a recognized investigative or disciplinary
body or affect, in any way, compliance with a validly issued and enforceable subpoena
or summons.
2 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDADs (CCH), 2 CODE OF PROFSIONAL CoNDucr § 301 at
4671 (Feb. 1984) (CCH ed. 1988).
It should be noted that this rule provides for disclosure of information for peer review
purposes. Some states have similar provisions in their accountant confidentiality statutes.
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the practical effect of which is to create a cause of action for the violation of a
client's confidences. 23 The remaining fifteen statutes, however, create a
testimonial privilege.24 The Missouri statute at issue in the Rook case, for
example, provides:
A certified public accountant or a public accountant shall not be examined by
judicial process or proceedings without the consent of his client as to any
communication made by the client to him in person or through the media of
books of account and financial record, or his advice, reports or working papers
given or made thereon in the course of professional employment, nor shall a
secretary, stenographer, clerk or assistant of a certified public accountant, or a
public accountant, be examined, without the consent of the client concerned,
concerning any fact the knowledge of which he has acquired in his capacity.
This privilege shall exist in all cases except when material to the defense of an
action against an accountant.25
Presumably state courts accord these privilege statutes the same degree of
deference granted other enactments of the state legislature. 26 Furthermore, to
See, e.g., Joseph V. Pease, Jr., Quality Review and Confientiality Laws, TAX ADvisER 189
(Mar. 1992) (describing quality review provisions of accountancy act passed in Alaska in
Spring 1991). Without such provisions, accountants must typically seek the client's written
permission to disclose confidential information as part of a peer review system. Failure to
do so, for example through a waiver provision in an engagement letter, will leave the
accountant exposed to liability. Id. The signing of such a waiver or the presence of a safe
harbor provision for peer review disclosure in the state confidentiality statute would negate
expectations of privacy. See supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
23 Such causes of action may exist independently under judge-made law. See, e.g.,
Wagenheim v. Alexander Grant & Co., 482 N.E.2d 955 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983).
24 Causey & McNair, supra note 18, at 535-45. The jurisdictions creating a
testimonial privilege are: Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico and
Tennessee. Id.
25 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 326.151 (Vernon 1989).
26 But see In re October 1985 Grand Jury No. 746, 530 N.E.2d 453 (1. 1988), in
which the Supreme Court of Illinois sustained a Cook County grand jury's subpoena of
ostensibly confidential records in the possession of a tax accountant. Id. at 454, 460. The
grand jury was investigating the alleged underpayment of Illinois income taxes, and the
Illinois privilege statute provided: "A public accountant shall not be required by any court
to divulge information or evidence which has been obtained by him in his confidential
capacity as a public accountant." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 5533 (1985). The
Supreme Court of Illinois held that the statute was intended only to privilege information or
evidence received by an accountant in his "confidential capacity," which capacity, stated the
court, would not include accounting services with respect to taxation. 530 N.E.2d at 457-
58. The legislative history, however, suggested that such statutory intent was that of the
judiciary and the executive branch, not that of the legislature. The Illinois General
Assembly, in response to an appellate court's determination that the accountant was
required to comply with the subpoena, had approved an amendment to the statute that
1993]
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the extent that they constitute part of the governing law in a diversity case,
these statutes carry force in federal courts.27 When state law claims are
appended to federal questions, however, federal courts may accord these
statutes less deference. 28 When a possible violation of the Internal Revenue
Code is at issue, the statutes receive no deference at all: Despite state
recognition of a special relationship between accountants and their clients, the
federal courts have steadfastly refused to recognize an accountant-client
privilege under federal law.29 Against this background, the magistrate in the
Rook case refused to dismiss the indictments against the defendant. 30
This Note now turns to a discussion of the refusal of the federal courts to
recognize an accountant-client privilege in criminal tax prosecutions. It will be
argued that this refusal leaves little room for counsel to protect clients from the
wiles of their accountants, although in some unusual circumstances counsel
may successfully employ a Fourth Amendment defense.
B. Treatment in Federal Criminal Tax Prosecutions
Federal courts now trace their refusal to recognize the accountant-client
privilege in criminal tax prosecutions to two Supreme Court decisions, Couch
v. United States3l and United States v. Arthur Young & Co.32 In Couch, an
accountant possessed a client's business and tax records to assist the
provided: "This privilege... was intended to indude but not be limited to any documents,
information, or evidence obtained or used in connection with any tax services performed by
the public accountant." 530 N.E.2d at 458 (emphasis added). The amendment was vetoed
by the Governor. Id.
27 See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. of Am. v. Talisman, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 490
(D.C. 1975). The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that rules of privilege are to be
determined according to state law when state law supplies the rule of decision. FaD. R.
EviD. 501.
28 See, e.g., Win. T. Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Corp., 671 F.2d 100 (3d
Cir. 1982). The Thompson court held that when there are federal law claims in a case also
presenting state law claims, the federal rule favoring admissibility, rather than any state law
privilege, is the controlling rule. Id. at 104.
29 See, e.g., Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1954); Falsone v.
United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953); Gariepy v. United States, 189 F.2d 459 (6th
Cir. 1951); Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1949) (cases cited in
Couch v. United States, 469 U.S. 322, 335 (1972)). See generally Phillip E. Hassman,
Wuzt Constitutes Pivileged Conmmunications with Preparer of Federal Tax Returns So As to
Render Communication InadmIsble in Federal Tax Prosecution, 36 A.L.R. FED. 686
(1978).30 See Bryant, supra note 11.
31 409 U.S. 322 (1972).
32 465 U.S. 805 (1984). See United States v. Rockwell Int'l, 897 F.2d 1255, 1265 (3d
Cir. 1990) (citing Arthur Young for the nonexistence of a federal accountant-client
privilege).
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preparation of income tax returns. 33 The Service summoned the taxpayer's
documents from the accountant.34 The taxpayer challenged the summons,
contending that the "extortion of... testimony or... private papers to be
used as evidence" 35 violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the
Constitution.
The Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege was unavailable,
reasoning that the taxpayer had not been compelled to incriminate herself
because the summons had been directed not at her, but at her accountant. 36 The
Court then rejected the taxpayer's Fourth Amendment argument, that the
confidential nature of the accountant-client relationship created an expectation
of privacy rendering forced production of her records an unreasonable
government search or seizure.37 The Fourth Amendment was unavailable, the
Court concluded, because there could be little expectation of privacy "where
records are handed to an accountant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of
much of the information therein is required in an income tax return" and that
accountants might require the right to disclose the records to protect themselves
under section 7206.3 8
33 Couch, 409 U.S. at 324.
34 Id. at 325. The summons power derives from I.R.C. § 7602, which provides in
pertinent part:
(a) Authority to summon, etc.-For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness
of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of
any person for any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary is
authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant
or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any
officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care
of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for
tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary may deem proper,
to appear before the Secretary at a time and place named in the summons and to
produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under
oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be
relevant or material to such inquiry.
I.R.C. § 7602 (West Supp. 1992). The Court has upheld a special agent's use of such a
summons to further a tax investigation with "civil and possible criminal consequences." See
Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
35 Couch, 409 U.S. at 330.
3 6 Id. at 322.
37 Id. at 335.
38 Id. But see G. Stevenson Smith, Do Executives Believe They Have a Right to
Privileged Communications with Their CPAs?, 19 MID-ATLANTIc J. oF Bus. 15, 19 (1981)
19931
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The Couch decision reflects practical considerations. The tax system
imposes upon citizens a duty of disclosure and relies heavily upon honest self-
reporting. The undue extension of constitutional protections into the system
would be problematic. 39 In dicta, however, the Court suggested another
rationale for its decision: "Although not in itself controlling, we note that no
confidential accountant-client privilege exists under federal law, and no state-
created privilege has been recognized in federal cases." 40
The Court dealt with a section 7206 summons once again in United States
v. Arthur Young & Co. 41 Rather than assisting in the preparation of tax returns,
however, the accountant in Arthur Young had been reviewing a corporation's
financial statements to ensure compliance with federal securities laws.42 While
reviewing the financial statements, the auditor prepared tax accrual workpapers
relating to the evaluation of a reserve that had been set aside against contingent
tax liabilities.43 After a routine audit revealed questionable payments to a
(empirical evidence suggests executives generally expect that communications with their
accountants will be kept in confidence and that lack of privilege hampers full and frank
disclosure).
39 Couch, 409 U.S. at 335.
40 Id. In dissent, Justices Douglas and Marshall showed less concern for the federal tax
system. According to Justice Douglas, the taxpayer's accountant is an agent for a specific
purpose-the preparation of tax returns. As such, the accountant owes the petitioner-
taxpayer fiduciary duties, including the duty not to use the taxpayer's records for
unauthorized purposes. Under these circumstances, wrote Justice Douglas, it could hardly
be said that the taxpayer does not have an expectation (presumably reasonable) of privacy.
I. at 340 (Douglas, I., dissenting).
Justice Marshall took an intermediate position. Marshall would have made the
existence of a state accountant-client privilege a relevant consideration in determining
whether there existed an expectation of privacy. ld. at 350 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He
would also have made the complexity of the tax law a relevant consideration. "[PIrivileged
or not," wrote Justice Marshall, "disclosure to an accountant is rather close to disclosure to
an attorney.... If petitioner had sought to take advantage of some complicated provision of
the tax laws, and needed the help of an accountant to do so, I would be quite reluctant to
hold that the transfer of her records was a surrender of the privacy of the papers." Id. at
351. Justice Marshall's observation is particularly relevant to the Rook case because
Checkmate had served as an advocate for Rook in a civil audit. Bryant, supra note 1. Thus,
one would think Rook's expectation of privacy approached that which clients have in
communications with their attorneys.
41 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
42Id. at 808-09.
43 Tax accrual workpapers, the Court explained, pinpoint the "soft spots" in corporate
tax returns by highlighting those areas in which the corporate taxpayer has taken a position
that may later be challenged by the Internal Revenue Service. They may document
interviews with corporate personnel, judgments on questions of potential tax liability, and
suggestions for alternative treatments of certain transactions for tax purposes. Id. at 812-13.
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"special disbursement account," the Service instituted a criminal investigation
and summoned the accountant's workpapers. 44
When the accountancy and its client refused to comply with the summons,
the Service brought, and succeeded in, and enforcement action. On appeal, the
court of appeals determined that the workpapers were relevant to the Service's
investigation, but held that the public interest in promoting full disclosure to
accountants, and thereby maintaining the integrity of securities markets,
required the protection of the workpapers under a work-product immunity
doctrine.45 The Supreme Court disagreed, interpreting section 7206 strictly to
support a congressional policy favoring disclosure of all relevant information. 46
The Court then used the dicta in Couch (to the effect that the federal courts do
not recognize an accountant-client privilege) to support its holding that the
appellate court's work-product immunity doctrine had been erroneously
forged. 47
Lower courts have read Couch and Arthur Young for the proposition that
federal courts will not recognize an accountant-client privilege in tax
enforcement matters. While it seems clear that there is no such privilege under
these circumstances, neither of those cases actually presented a question of
accountant-client privilege. Couch was a Fourth Amendment48 and Fifth
Amendment case, while Arthur Young was a matter of construing section 7206.
The tendency of lower courts to gloss over the circumstances of cases before
them and merely pronounce the nonexistence of an accountant-client privilege,
then, reflects snowballing dicta rather than precise legal reasoning. Not all
cases involving accountants fit the patterns of Couch and Young. When dealing
with accountant-informants, practitioners, as discussed below, would do well to
phrase their pleadings in terms of circumstances giving rise to reasonable
expectation of privacy. Those who ignore the Fourth Amendment and argue for
an accountant-client privilege climb the scaffold of their own volition.
4 4 1d. at 808-09.
45 Id. at 810; see United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982),
rev'd in part, 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
46 Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 817.
471d.
48 Both the Fourth Amendment and state accountant-client privilege seek to further
social goals, such as privacy, in derogation of the search for truth. Their dimensions,
however, are not coextensive. Courts have not been meticulous in distinguishing the two
bodies of law and their application to cases under consideration.
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II. USE OF THE ACCOUNTANT-INFORMANT BY THE SERVICE
An analysis of accountant-informants requires an explanation of the
purposes, processes, and authority governing their use. Within the limits of
available public information on these matters, such discussion proceeds below.
A. Criminal Investigations and Infonnants Generally
In general, criminal sanctions for willful violation of the Internal Revenue
Code are imposed under Internal Revenue Code sections 7201-7207 and
relevant sections of the United States Criminal Code.49 Criminal investigations
are carried out by the Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue
Service and, upon referral, by the Department of Justice.5 0 Most investigations
are prompted by referrals from special agents and other divisions of the
Service. Some, however, proceed upon the receipt of tips from the public and
other government agencies. 51
As part of a criminal investigation, the Service may rely on information
supplied by informants. The use of informants to secure such information is
authorized by the Internal Revenue Manual.52 Informants may supply
information on their own initiative or be urged to do so by the Service,53 and
these efforts may sometimes be financially rewarded.54 The information
49 The following sections of Title 18 of the U.S. Code (the U.S. Criminal Code) are
frequently used in tax prosecutions: § 2 (aiding and abetting); § 201 (bribery); § 371
(conspiracy); § 1001 (false statements); and § 1621 (perjury). See MICHAEL D. ROSE &
JOHN C. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION, § 13.31, at 822 (3d ed. 1988 & Supp.
1989).
Most prosecutions seem to be brought under Internal Revenue Code sections 7201,
7203, and 7206. Section 7201 provides criminal sanctions for persons willfully attempting
to evade or defeat any tax or tax payment. Section 7203 provides criminal sanctions for
willful failure to pay a tax when due, to file a timely return (other than a declaration of
estimated income), to keep records, or to supply required information. Section 7206
provides criminal sanctions for several defined felonies, including preparing or assisting in
the preparation of fraudulent or false returns or other documents. I.R.C. §§ 7201, 7203,
7206 (1991).50 See SALTZMAN, supra note 7, at 12-8 n.23.
51 Id. at 12-9, 12-10.
52 6 I.R.M. (CCH) § 9373.2, at 28,175 (Mar. 24, 1989). The Supreme Court has
upheld the use of informants to obtain incriminating evidence against defendants. See Hoffa
v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
53 6 I.R.M., supra note 52, § 9373.2(1), at 28,175.
54 Id.
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gathered from informants will typically be used to establish the elements of
willfulness and misrepresentation of income.55
Informants fall into one or more of several categories. "Anonymous
informants" are those who either refuse to identify themselves or who use
fictitious names and whose true identities are unknown to the Service.56
"Confidential informants" are those who request that their names be held in
strict confidence, 57 while "non-confidential" informants, as one might expect,
make no such requests. 58 "Controlled informants," such as Checkmate, are
those informants who are paid for the information they voluntarily provide or
who, unpaid, provide information at the urging of a special agent.59 The
Service's internal guidelines provide that special agents are to obtain
authorization for controlled informants before directing them to gather
information on noncompliance.60
One agent has posited that people are motivated to serve as informants by
their patriotism.61 The facts of the Rook case and the existence of a reward
program, however, suggest that noble motivations are the exception rather than
the rule. The rule is that informants are motivated by hatred, extrinsic rewards,
and the prospect of their own punishment.
Hatred or revenge may be assumed to be a prime motivator because many
informants are former spouses and employees. A variation on this theme
appears in the colorful United States v. Miceli.62 In that case the defendant's
estranged wife not only served as an informant, but also clumsily broke into the
defendant's office to steal documents. 63 Revenge was undoubtedly sweet, but it
was by no means the lonely Mrs. Miceli's only reward: in exchange for her
55 Without the help of an informant, the Service uses several different methods to
prove indirectly the existence of income the taxpayer has failed to report. These methods
include the net worth method, the case expenditure method, the bank deposits method, and
the percentage mark-up method. The net worth method, used in Costello v. United States,
350 U.S. 359 (1956), is the most widely used. Under this method an estimate of income is
calculated from the difference between the person's beginning and end-of-the-year total
assets, as adjusted for nondeductible personal expenditures. See ROSE & CHOMMIE, supra
note 49, at 826, 827.
56 6 I.R.M., supra note 52.
57 Id. § 9373.2(1)(c). These confidentiality provisions may allow agents to conceal
from supervisors the fact that the informant is an accountant, apparently the situation in the
Rook case. See supra note 12; see also infra note 60.
58 6 I.R.M., supra note 52, § 9373.2(1)(b).
59 Id. § 9373.2(d).
60 Id. The Service's failure to follow its own internal guidelines, however, may be
insufficient cause to dismiss charges against a taxpayer. See United States v. Caceres, 440
U.S. 741 (1979).
61 See Berton, supra note 10.
62 774 F. Supp. 760 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
63 Id. at 764.
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information, the controlling special agent wined, dined, and had sexual
relations with her.64 Not all that glisters, however, is gold. 65 Mrs. Miceli
testified that after having sex with her the agent told her that he would be
keeping "in touch." 66 The agent's next and final "touch," however, consisted
of no more than a touch-tone telephone call described at trial as a "very cold
professional conversation." 67
The prospect of extrinsic rewards exists because the Internal Revenue Code
authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to pay such sums as deemed necessary
"for detecting and bringing to trial and punishment persons guilty of violating
the internal revenue laws, or conniving at the same, in cases where such
expenses are not otherwise provided for by law." 68 Service employees are
forbidden to urge individuals to inform for the sake of monetary rewards,
however, and they are prohibited from assuring any person that a reward of
any amount will be forthcoming. 69 Rewards are not paid except with respect to
taxes, fines, and penalties actually collected, and only then if the information
leading to the collection was voluntarily provided on the informant's
initiative.70 The amount of the reward, if any, is to be determined with regard
to the relative value of the information furnished. 71 Informants are kept
ignorant of this value.72
64 Id.
65 See, e.g., Thomas Gray, Ode on the Death of a Favorite Cat, Drowned in a Tub of
Gold Fishes, in FRANCiS TURNER PALGRAvE, THE GOLDEN TREAsURY 112, 113 (5th ed.
1964).66 Miceli, 774 F. Supp. at 764.
67 Id.
68 
.R.C. § 7623 (West Supp. 1992).
69 6 I.R.M. (CCH) § 9371.4(6), at 28,173 (Sept. 9, 1991).
70 6 I.R.M. (CCM) § 9371.5, at 28,173 (Apr. 3, 1986).
71 Id.
72 "[N]or should I.R.S. personnel indicate to an informant in any manner the amount
of the probable tax recovery or whether such recovery is based upon the information
submitted by the informant." 6 I.R.M., supra note 69.
In the year ending September 30, 1992, the Service received 10,966 claims for bounty.
Of these claims, 671 rewards, totaling $1.7 million, were paid. These tips enabled the
service to recover an extra $83.7 million in revenue. In 1991, 732 rewards were paid on
9,907 claims. The $1.5 million paid reflected the recovery of $58.4 million in revenue.
Over the 1991-92 period, then, the Service paid some 6.7% of the claims made with some
2.3% of the revenues collected. The rewards, of course, must be included in the snitch's
gross income. LR.C. § 61 (1991). See Tom Herman, Srdtclingfor Dollars, WALL ST. 1.,
Dec. 9, 1992, at Al.
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As noted above, many informants are motivated by the possibility of
punishment.7 3 Sometimes the Service has the informant "over a barrel" for
nonpayment of taxes.74 The Service is then in a position to file and execute a
lien against the taxpayer-informant's property if the taxpayer refuses to
"cooperate." 75 There have been efforts to limit the discretion of the Service
with respect to the overdue taxes of informants. 76 These efforts, however, have
not yet amounted to a significant challenge to the use of accountant-informants.
While the motives of informants make for fascinating discussion, so too do
the circumstances that made the Rook case a media event. These circumstances
are briefly discussed below.
B. The Rook Case: The Special Case of the Accountant-Informant
The Rook case was the first to publicize the Service's use of accountants as
informants, 77 and at first glance there seems little reason to believe the Service
was pleased with the publicity. Given the availability of alternative enforcement
methods, 78 many people think it undesirable to fight tax fraud by corrupting
parties with special duties of loyalty. Many also consider it unseemly for the
federal government to coerce people on the verge of bankruptcy to prostitute
themselves and thereby jeopardize their futures and reputations as
professionals.
Although the Service might seem to have suffered from negative publicity,
however, some might suggest that the use of accountant-informants will grow.
Moles are an efficient means of gathering intelligence, and as one agent has put
it, "with its limited budget, [the Service] needs all the help it can get to catch
the country's tax evaders." 79 Others might argue that the courts have created a
favorable climate for the use of accountant-informants by mechanically
73 "Fear is a great motivator and is maintained by a dread of punishment which never
fails." NICcoLo MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINcE 74 (Luigi Ricci trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1935).
74 See supra note 3.
75 See I.R.C. §§ 6321-23 (West Supp. 1992).
76 See Ta Report, WALL ST. I., Mar. 11, 1992, at Al (Senate Finance Committee tax
bill would make it a crime for federal agents to offer forgiveness of taxes to induce lawyers,
CPAs, or practitioners known as enrolled agents to inform on their clients).
77 See Bryant, supra note 1. An earlier case featuring a financial advisor seems to have
escaped media attention. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
78 In arguing for the admissibility of evidence received from Checkmate, the Service
claimed that any documents received from Checkmate relating to Rook's business could
easily have been obtained through normal tax audit proceedings. Berton, supra note 10.
79 Id. An internal survey prompted by the Rook case indicated that of 880 controlled
informants used by the Service, some 40 were accountants. l
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asserting that there is no accountant-client privilege. 80 As argued above,
however, neither Couch nor Arthur Young necessarily support this proposition.
Although the Internal Revenue Code summons provision81 may evidence a
policy against allowing accountants to impede tax compliance, 82 Congress has
never approved of the practice of inducing fiduciaries to breach their duties.
The refusal of the federal courts to recognize an accountant-client privilege,
however, raises two questions about the use of accountant-informants: (1)
whether the use of accountant-informants is limited directly by the Constitution
or other laws; and (2) if there are no or few legal limitations on the use of
accountant-informants, whether such use is otherwise constrained.
IV. THE (LIMITED) DIRECT LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF ACCOUNTANT-
INFORMANTS
Members of the defense bar have argued that clients are protected against
accountant-informants by the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment.8 3 They have also argued that the federal courts may
80 See, e.g., United States v. Rockwell Int'l, 897 F.2d 1255, 1265 (3d Cir. 1990).
81 See supra note 34.
82See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984).
83 See, e.g., United States v. Miceli, 774 F. Supp. 760 (W.D.N.Y. 1990); see also
Bryant, supra note 11.
Two points are in order with respect to the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination
Clause. First, barring extraordinary circumstances, statements made by the taxpayer to the
accountant-informant will not be regarded as privileged, self-incriminating statements. Tax
investigations, which frequently lead to criminal prosecutions, are not immune from the
requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), regarding warnings to be given
to a person in custody. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968) (documents obtained
during interviews of taxpayer-prisoner by revenue agent held inadmissible when taxpayer
had not been read Miranda warnings). A special agent's interview, however, does not by
itself amount to a custodial interrogation and does not require full Miranda warnings.
Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976). By extension, incriminating responses to
noncustodial questioning by an account-informant will not implicate the Self-Incrimination
Clause.
Second, there is no self-incrimination when taxpayer documents are surrendered to the
Service by the taxpayer or a third party. In Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976),
the petitioner-taxpayer's income tax returns, which revealed his gambling activities, were
introduced into evidence as proof of the federal gambling conspiracy charge against him.
Id. at 649-50. Reasoning that petitioner made the incriminating disdosures on his returns
instead of claiming the privilege, the Court held that the petitioner's disclosures were not
co pelled and that petitioner's Fifth Amendment rights were not implicated. Id. at 665.
Furthermore, tax workpapers of an accountant or attorney prepared before any compulsion
in the form of a summons or other process are not privileged under the Fifth Amendment.
The Fifth Amendment protects against compelled sef-incrimination, not the disclosure of
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use their supervisory powers to shield the client's communications to the
accountant. 84 For most cases involving accountant-informants, most of these
defenses will be without merit. For all cases involving accountant-informants,
some of these defenses will always be without merit.
A. A Shot in the Dark: Protection from Unreasonable Searches
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches.85 A "search"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment exists when there is an intrusion
upon an actual expectation of privacy that society regards as reasonable.86 Such
a search, however, is not unconstitutional unless the search is itself
unreasonable. 87 Furthermore, even if a search is unreasonable, as a general
rule the Fourth Amendment offers no protection against searches carried out by
private parties.88 The exception to this rule occurs when it can be shown that
the ostensibly private party conducting the search is actually an instrument or
agent of the government. 89 Whether a party is an instrument or agent of the
government is determined by the totality of the circumstances. 90 Two factors
critical to determining whether a party is an instrument or agent are: (1)
whether the government had knowledge of, and acquiesced to, the search; and
(2) whether the search was carried out for law enforcement purposes. 91
It is improbable that an accountant without prior government ties who
voluntarily passes client information to the Service on a single occasion would
be deemed an agent of the government. Arguably, the only critical factor
present in such a scenario would be that the intrusion took place for law
enforcement purposes. The accountant who gathers information at the bidding
of a special agent, however, would almost assuredly be labeled an instrument
of the government. The intrusion would be undertaken for law enforcement
purposes and the government would have knowledge of the accountant's
private information. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); Garner v. United States,
424 U.S. 648 (1976).84 See, e.g., Miceli, 774 F. Supp. at 760.
85 The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST., amend. IV.
86 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988).
87 See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925).
88 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
89 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984).90 See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989).
91 See, e.g., United States v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1987).
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actions. Even in this situation, however, ordinarily Fourth Amendment
prohibitions would be without effect. As the Court stated in Couch, there is no
expectation of privacy in the conveyance of information to be used for the
purpose of preparing tax returns. 92 With no reasonable expectation of privacy,
there is no "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes. 93 In the generic
accountant-informant case, then, the protections of the Fourth Amendment will
be unavailable.
It would be precipitous to conclude, however, that every use of an
accountant is without a reasonable expectation of privacy. Accountant-client
privilege statutes and common-law liability for nonconsensual disclosures of
confidential matters indicate that accountants owe duties to their clients and
suggest that in many circumstances expectations of privacy are reasonable.94
The Court's refusal to find an expectation of privacy in the use of a tax
accountant in Couch was based on the need to protect the tax system and on the
genuine belief that the defendant in that case had no actual expectation of
privacy. After all, the taxpayer in that case had assembled the information for
public disclosure. A court could reach a contrary decision, however, in a case
involving an accountant who discovers information while undertaking activities
not intended to result in disclosure. Reliance on accountants who perfbrm
sensitive private accounting functions could conceivably create an expectation
of privacy that society might regard as reasonable, especially if the employer is
of a type not obligated to report its financial results to the public95 and the
accountant's role in tax preparation is merely incidental. 96 Thus, for example,
if the proprietor of a small business employed an accountant to generate
information for internal reporting purposes, 97 and the same accountant, an
92 Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973).
93 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988).
94 See supra notes 38 & 40.
95 For example, a non-SEC reporting company.
96 The first of these qualifications, that the employer is not obligated to disclose its
financial data to the public, avoids the situation in Arthur Young. The second is designed to
avoid the situation in Couch. See supra notes 42, 33 and accompanying text. The possibility
that "much of the information... is required in an income tax return," Couch, 409 U.S. at
335, cannot be determinative of privacy rights. Were such the case, police officers could
snatch a sealed note from an unsuspected person, read it, and not violate the Fourth
Amendment if perchance the note included only a taxpayer's name, address, and signature
(information regularly disclosed on a tax return) along with a brief message, e.g., "you are
my accountant and I love you."
97 One such internal reporting function could be variance analysis. Variance analysis
involves comparing actual costs against standards for what a given activity should cost It
can be used to pinpoint problems in the production process and to assign responsibility for
cost overruns. This "internal reporting" is to be contrasted with "external reporting," e.g.,
the mandatory disclosure for tax or security law purposes that destroys legitimate
expectations of privacy. See ROBERT ANTHONY & JAMEs REECE, AccoukrMG: TXr AND
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informant, volunteered to help the owner with the owner's income taxes, a
court might be justified in finding that the taxpayer-owner's expectation of
privacy was reasonable. Because most American corporations are privately held
and need not report financial results to the public, and because many American
businesses are carried out by sole proprietors who prepare their own taxes, it
should not be assumed that the existence of an accountant who comes into
contact with tax preparation materials automatically destroys an otherwise
legitimate expectation of privacy. Thus the Fourth Amendment might create a
valid defense although the accountant-client privilege does not.98
Because this Fourth Amendment defense is something of a shot in the dark,
defense attorneys have quite properly sought alternatives. As discussed below,
however, the alternatives suggested thus far are unlikely to succeed. 99
B. Other Professed Limitations; Due Process and Supervisory Powers
Members of the defense bar have claimed that the use of accountant-
informants violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and that the
courts can contain the practice through their supervisory powers. 1°° The Due
Process Clause provides that "[n]o person shall... be deprived of life, liberty,
CAsEs 693-731 (8th ed. 1989) (illustrating variance analysis as aspect of managerial
accounting).98 In what appears to be a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a cause of action for violation
of Fourth Amendment rights is being urged in a late-breaking accountant-informant case.
SafeCard Services, Inc. filed suit against its former tax accountant, Ernest A. Varvoutis IMI,
the Internal Revenue Service, and named Internal Revenue Service agents on October 9,
1992 in federal court in Fort Lauderdale. The suit seeks $58 million, including punitive
damages, for injuries resulting from unreasonable searches and seizures. The suit alleges
that Varvoutis, at the behest of Internal Revenue Service agents, gave the Service
documents belonging to the taxpayer to be used to establish probable cause for a search
warrant. The suit alleges that, in a gross display of bootstrapping, the search warrant that
issued as a result of establishing probable cause with the purloined documents was used to
seize the same documents, which in the meantime had been returned to the company. See
Kurt Eichenwald, Safe Card's Dispute with U.S. Grows, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 12, 1992, at D4;
Amy Bach, Big Suits, THE AM. LAW., Dec. 1992 at 70-72.
99 In passing, it should be noted that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel defense is
not an alternative because the work of the accountant-informant is accomplished before the
client is charged. The Court has limited the attachment of an accused's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel to those critical stages "at or after the time that judicial proceedings have
been initiated against him-whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information, or arraignment.'" See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398
(1977) (citing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)). Thus, the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel does not attach until the government has committed itself to prosecution.
Kirby, 406 U.S. at 682. The fact that an investigation has focused on a taxpayer is
insufficient to demonstrate that the government has committed itself to prosecute. See Hoffa
v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
100 See, e.g., United States v. Miceli, 774 F. Supp. 760 (W.D.N.Y. 1990).
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or property, without due process of law." 10 1 The Court has stated that the Due
Process Clause "inescapably imposes... an exercise of judgment upon the
whole course of the proceedings [resulting in a conviction] in order to ascertain
whether they offend those canons of decency and fairness which express the
notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with
the most heinous offenses." 102 Consistent with this statement, the Court as
used the Due Process Clause to suppress evidence gathered in means shocking
to the conscienceY°3 In Rochin v. California,1°4 for example, police officers
had a physician pump the stomach of a suspect who ingested drugs as the
police burst into his bedroom.105 The Court held that the police had obtained
Rochin's conviction by methods offensive to the Due Process Clause.1 6
While the Court has not foreclosed use of the Due Process Clause to curb
overzealous law enforcement, it has been reluctant to resort to it. In United
States v. Russell,10 7 for example, the defendant alleged that the government had
acted outrageously when undercover narcotics officers provided him with a
scarce ingredient for the manufacture of methamphetamine, a crime for which
he was convicted.108 The Court summarily rejected the defendant's due process
claim, but noted in dicta that "we may some day be presented with a situation
in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due
process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial
processes to obtain a conviction."109
One reason for the Court's reluctance to use the Due Process Clause to
rectify official wrongdoing is the threat such use poses to the separation of
powers. 110 Another reason is the existence of alternative remedies.'" Thus in
Hampton v. United States,112 another narcotics entrapment case, a plurality of
the Court suggested that if the police join in illegal activity with a defendant
beyond the scope of their duty, the remedy lies not in freeing the culpable
defendant through the Due Process Clause, but in prosecuting the police under
applicable provisions of state or federal law. 113
101 U.S. CONST., amend. V.
102 Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401,416-17 (1945).
103 See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
104Id.
10 5 Id. at 166.
106 Id. at 172. Rochin has been limited to situations involving coercion, violence, or
brutality to the person. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 133 (1954).
107 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
108 Id. at 424.
109 Id. at 431-32.
110 On this issue see infra note 121 and accompanying text.
I11 See, e.g., Rochin, 342 U.S. at 170-72.
112 425 U.S. 484 (1990).
113 Id. at 490.
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Some members of the defense bar have asked the courts to use their
supervisory powers to suppress evidence taken from within fiduciary
relationships. 1 4 The Supreme Court's treatment of the supervisory powers,
however, closely parallels its treatment of the Due Process Clause, and the
federal courts will not easily be convinced to invoke them.
The Court's understanding of the scope, if not the purposes, of the
"inherent" supervisory powers has evolved. In McNabb v. United States,115
the Court implicitly defined the purposes of the powers by stating that they
could be used to exclude evidence: (1) to deter illegal conduct by government
officials; and (2) to protect the integrity of the federal courts by preventing
them from becoming accomplices to misconduct.116 As for the scope of the
powers, members of the Court once understood the scope of the powers to be
expansive.117 That understanding has since been refined, however, as their
range of operation has been constricted from the prevention of misconduct to
the prevention of illegal conduct that constitutes an outright violation of
existing constitutional rights.118 Thus, for example, if government agents steal
from an accountant evidence tending to incriminate the accountant's client, the
supervisory powers probably would be of no avail:
The supervisory power does not authorize a federal court to suppress
otherwise admissible evidence on the ground that it was seized unlawfully from
a third party not before the court. Our Fourth Amendment decisions have
established beyond any doubt that the interest in deterring illegal searches does
114 See United States v. Miceli, 774 F. Supp. 760 (W.D.N.Y. 1990). A Due Process
Clause claim is being asserted in a companion suit to the SafeCard action. See supra note
98; see also Gregg Fields, Accountant Faces Suits by SafieCard, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 13,
1992, at Cl.
115 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
116 Id at 345, 347.
117 Thus, for example, in a famous dissent Justice Brandeis wrote:
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected
to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws,
existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously."
Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches
the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the
end justifies the means-to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to
secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against
that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
118 See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
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not justify the exclusion of tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was
not the victim of the challenged practices. 1 19
As with the Court's reluctance to use the Due Process Clause, the
narrowing of the supervisory powers may be explained in part by the Court's
fear of upsetting the constitutional balance. Thus in United States v. Payner20
former Chief Justice Burger wrote that "[o]rderly government under our
system of separate powers calls for internal self-restraint and discipline in each
Branch; this Court has no general supervisory authority over operations of the
Executive Branch, as it has with respect to the federal courts." 121
Consequently, although judges may grow angry at the methods of the Service,
it is unlikely that evidence gathered by offensive, but not clearly
unconstitutional, techniques will be suppressed under the supervisory powers.
Given the difficulties of a Fourth Amendment defense and the apparent
irrelevance of the Fifth Amendment and the supervisory powers, this Note
turns to an examination of natural or "indirect" limitations on the use of
accountant-informants.
V. INDIRECT LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF ACCOUNTANT-INFORMANTS
Given the suggestion that accountant-informants are the wave of the
future, 122 an inquiry into natural or "indirect" limitations on the use of
accountant-informants is appropriate. Indirect limitations include factors other
than the legal defenses available to taxpayer-targets that tend to affect the
willingness of the Service to use accountant-informants, the willingness of
accountants to serve as informants, or both. Economic theory, which provides
a useful framework for understanding indirect limitations, suggests that the
prospect of an accountant reign of terror is remote; the quantity of accountant-
informant services demanded by the Service will likely be de mininis, as will
be the quantity supplied by accountants.
A. Optimal Reliance
As part of its goal of ensuring compliance, the Service is concerned about
its public image. "The highest priority of Criminal Investigation is to create a
maximum positive impact on the compliance attitudes and practices of
119 Id. at 735 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978)).
120 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
121 Id. at 737 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See generally Sara Sun Beale, Reconsideing
Supervisory Power in Oininal Ca es: Constitutional and Statutory Li'ts on the Authority
of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. Ray. 1433 (1984).
122 See Berton, supra note 10.
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taxpayers through an effective General Enforcement Program (GEP). Within
GEP, priority will be given to high impact coordinated compliance
projects." 123 Faced with budget constraints, the Service strives to maximize
deterrence (and hence compliance) by pursuing high-visibility targets likely to
be convicted. 124 Consequently, the Service enjoys the limelight: "the Service
will endeavor to obtain news coverage of its enforcement activities in order to
help deter violations of the internal revenue laws and increase the confidence of
conscientious taxpayers that the Service prosecutes violators." 125
Given the Service's objectives it is appropriate to ask whether the use of
accountant-informants creates the type of public perception the Service desires.
One might suppose that in the short-run the use of accountant-informants to nab
noncomplying parties is an attractive strategy. Accountant-informant are an
inexpensive and effective weapon. 126 In the long-run, however, a public put off
by the Service's lack of "fair play" and "unlawfuiness" could grow hostile
towards the Service and seek congressional limitations on the use of
accountants-informants. 127 This type of long-run and short-nm analysis,
however, is a simplistic and likely erroneous approach to understanding the
merits and future of the accountant-informant strategy.
A better understanding of the accountant-informant strategy appreciates the
ability of accountant-informants not only to scuttle their clients, but also to
signal to the public the "public-relations cost" the Service is willing to bear to
bring offenders to justice. To borrow from game theory, 128 the Service should
123 6 I.R.M. (CCH) § 9161.1, at 28,021-5 (Aug. 16, 1979).
12 4 See SALTZMAN, supra note 7, at 12-2, 12-3.
125 6 I.R.M. (CCH) § 9161.6, at 28,022 (June 6, 1979).
126 See Berton, supra note 10; see also supra note 79.
127 See supra note 76. For examples of "traditional" public hostility towards the
Service, see Ellen Schultz, "Misery 11" Could Be a Stephen King Book About iRS Agents,
WALL ST. J., April 14, 1992, at Al (agents are shot at, ridiculed socially, attacked by dogs;
taxpayers file bogus liens against them and report payments to them to suggest the agents
are themselves underreporting income).
128 Game theory is a branch of economics founded by John Von Neumann and Oskar
Morgenstern. See J OHN VON NEUMANN & OsKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMEs AND
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944). Game theory can be used to understand competitive situations
and predict their outcomes. One such situation arises with respect to income taxes. Although
the tax system also relies on voluntary compliance, at bottom its integrity depends upon
compulsion. Compulsion is needed to ensure compliance because the objective of the
taxpayer is incompatible with the objective of the Service. The taxpayer seeks to minimize
taxes paid, while the Service seeks to maximize taxes paid. Thus, the taxpayer and the
Service are involved in a competitive situation.
Each "player" in this situation has a choice of strategies to cope with a world of
uncertainty. The Service, faced with uncertainty about the compliance behavior of the
taxpayer, may choose to investigate the taxpayer or not investigate the taxpayer. The
taxpayer, faced with uncertainty about the actions of the Service, may choose to comply or
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be viewed as a participant in an iterated game with taxpayers.12 9 As part of this
game, the Service may rationally make a strategic move.130 One such move, to
be distinguished from a mere threat, is the credible commitment to
deterrence.' 31 By incurring a sizeable public relations cost through playing the
accountant-informant strategy, the Service indicates that it is deadly serious
about prosecution-a crucial requirement for credible deterrence. The long-run
payoffs to the "playing nasty" strategy transcend the payoffs to sinking the
individual tax criminal and represent the returns to an investment in reputation.
The beauty of the strategy is that, once the reputation is established, the Service
need not rely extensively on accountant-informants. In other words, some
limited resort to accountant-informants is sufficient to maintain a reputation and
to further the Service's mission of ensuring compliance. Ironically, then, rather
than harming the Service, to the extent the Wall Street Journal's coverage of
the Rook case suggested a season in the sun for accountant-informants, the
Journal served as an instrument of the Service's strategy. That is to say, it
would not be inappropriate to call the Journal a "capitalist tool."
not comply. Because their objectives are incapable of alignment, the taxpayer-Service game
is called a "noncooperative" game. That is, there are no negotiable and enforceable joint
strategies the two players can pursue to obtain a common objective. See generally PAUL A.
VATTER ET AL., QUANrrrATIVE METHODs IN MANAGEMENT 483-550 (1978); RoBERT
PINDYcK & DANmL RuBnFELD, MCRoEcXNom 459 (1989).
129 Equilibria in interated, or repeated, games can differ qualitatively from those of
identical games played only once. Furthermore, equilibria in iterated games may depend on
whether the game will be iterated ad infinitwn or only a finite number of times.
Results in iterated games can differ from those in one-shot games because the past
provides a clue: iterated games provide information about the strategy the other player is
likely to choose. In an iterated game a player may develop a reputation for using a certain
strategy. This reputation will be considered by a rational opponent.
Results in finite iterated games may differ from those in infinitely iterated games
because players who know of some "final round" also know that their opponents have an
incentive in that round to deviate from equilibrium strategies that might otherwise evolve. If
a player has an incentive to deviate in a known final round, a rational opponent will adjust
his or her behavior accordingly. A rational player, however, would expect an opponent to
adjust his or her behavior in this manner and, anticipating the opponent's behavior in the
final round, will adjust his or her own behavior in the penultimate round, and so on and so
forth. Thus, finite iterated games can have solutions different from those in otherwise
identical infinitely iterated games because a player can "see what is coming." See PINDYCK
& RUBINFLD, supra note 128, at 466-68.
130 "A strategic move is one that influences the other person's choice, in a manner
favorable to one's self, by affecting the other person's expectations on how one's self will
behave." THoMAs C. ScHELLING, THE STRATEGYOFCONFLICr 160 (1960).
131 See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 128, at 471-82. Credible commitments
require a "double-take." At first glance, the actor appears to be acting against self-interest.
When the viewer has some perspective, however, it is apparent that the actor is purposefully
"hurting" himself to achieve some greater end-that which will be achieved by affecting the
expectations of opponents.
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The game-theoretic understanding of the long-range benefits of the
accountant-information strategy is strengthened to the extent that the "naive!
analysis hypothesized earlier can be discredited. An important element of that
analysis was the assumption that the public would successfully pressure
Congress to limit the use of accountant-informants. Certain derivative effects of
the accountant-informant strategy, as well as the nature of collective action,
however, suggest such pressure is unlikely.
One derivative effect of the accountant-informant strategy is taxpayer
uncertainty. Taxpayers cannot be certain whether or not their accountants are
informants. While taxpayers face uncertainty, however, the Service does not.
The service has inside information; it knows the identities of its stool pigeons.
Economists call this imbalance of knowledge "asymmetric information." 132
While asymmetric information may deter conspiratorial relationships
between accountants and clients, it may also create rifts among accountants
because of its effect on the market for accountants. 133 Large, well-established
accountancies will gain from the use of accountant-informants because such
accountancies can implicitly warrant that their accountants are not informants.
The implied warranty exists because a rational client would infer that the costs
of a lost reputation and of potential liability at law to such an accountancy are
undoubtedly greater than the paltry awards offered by the Service. Thus, it
would not be in the interest of the firm or its members to serve as
informants. 13 4
Sole practitioners are probably less capable of transmitting this signal. If,
for the sole practitioner, the benefits from assisting the Service ever exceed the
132 See, e.g. PINDYCK & RUBINFIELD, supra note 128, at 591-615; see also DENNIS
W. CARLTON AND JEFFREY M. PERLoFF, MODERN INDusTRIAL ORGANIZATION 716-17
(1990).
133 The effect is to create a market for tax-accountant "lemons." See George A.
Akerlof, The Marketfor "Lemons' Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 QJ.
ECON. 488 (1970). Markets can be profoundly affected by asymmetric information. Unless
a seller can somehow signal to a prospective buyer the quality of the product to be sold, a
buyer who faces uncertainty about the quality of the product will rationally infer that the
seller's willingness to sell the product evidences a price in excess of the product's value.
The buyer will then lower the price at which he or she is willing to buy, and a self-fafilling
prophesy will occur: sellers with "high" quality products will leave the market in the belief
that the market price for their product is too low, and only the "low" quality products will
remain in the market. In the presence of uncertainty, bad products will drive out good.
Ultimately the quality of all products in the market will be poor and the market price will
fall to a commensurate level. Akerlof illustrated this process by reference to a market for
used cars. In that example, the result of uncorrected asymmetric information was a market
for "lemons."
134 This analysis assumes, of course, that the value of "internal rewards to ratting" are
negligible compared to the potential costs just described. It also assumes rationality, unity of
interest between the individual accountant and the employing entity, and a few other things.
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benefits of maintaining a professional reputation, it is likely that the balance
tips in favor of cooperation only because the value of the reputation is
exceedingly low. Reputation, however, is no more than an asset-goodwill--
the value of which can be estimated by discounting future cash flow. By
assumption, this cash flow will tend to be smaller with smaller accountancies.
It will also be smaller when the accountancy is in financial distress or the
accountancy does not have a perpetual existence-precisely the two problems
afflicting the beleaguered Checkmate.' 35 Presumably these situations are more
likely to obtain with sole practitioners. Thus, given uncertainty, clients will
have more reason to avoid sole practitioners.
That some accountants stand to gain by the use of accountant-informants, a
situation which creates a wedge within the profession and precludes unified,
strong lobbying efforts, is one reason to believe that Congress will not ban
their use.136Another reason exists in the nature of collective action. As a
general rule, large groups such as "the outraged public" are ineffective in
lobbying Congress. 137 If action is to be undertaken, that action will come not
135 See supra notes 3 and 13.
136 The AICPA Tax Division has been studying the issue of whether the AICPA
should seek a tax matters privilege. The matter has generated significant internal
disagreement. In favor of seeking a privilege, it is argued that the confidences of clients are
as important to accountants as they are to attorneys. It is also argued that without such
privileges accountants are at a competitive disadvantage to attorneys competing for the same
business. The last argument is unsound, for there is no attorney-client privilege when the
attorney is serving in the capacity of an accountant rather than as a legal advisor. See, e.g.,
Canaday v. United States, 354 F.2d 849, 857 (8th Cir. 1966) (no privilege because attorney
serving "merely as a scrivener"). In addition, the arguments against lobbying efforts are
quite strong. First, opponents argue that precious resources should not be spent on such
lobbying efforts when few clients have problems resulting from the lack of a privilege.
Furthermore, the burden of proof in civil tax proceedings is on the taxpayer, making the
privilege of still less practical value. Second, say opponents, the law relating to client
privilege is complex and if the privilege were adopted CPAs would end up transferring
money to lawyers for guidance in privilege matters. Finally, argue opponents, mistaken
disclosures could increase malpractice claims against accountants. See Raby, supra note 2;
see also James A. Woehlke, Tax Cwrents, THE TAX ADVIsER, Feb. 1992, at 123.
137 They are ineffective for three reasons:
First, the larger the group, the smaller the fraction of the total group benefit any
person acting in the group interest receives, and the less adequate the reward for any
group oriented action .... Second, since the larger the group, the smaller the share of
the total benefit going to any individual, or to any (absolutely) small subset of members
of the group, the less the likelihood that any small subset of the group, much less any
single individual, will gain enough from getting the collective good to bear the burden
of providing even a small amount of it .... Third, the larger the number of members
in the group, the greater the organization costs.
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from the demands of the general public, but from the demands of a special
interest group composed of accountants. 138 As noted above, however, the
interests of accountants are not necessarily unified in this matter, and any
efforts at regulation would likely face strong opposition from the Internal
Revenue Service, an entity that has found an extremely effective strategy for
ensuring a steady flow of dollars to a Congress not averse to spending them. 139
Even if Congress will not frustrate the use of accountant-informants, there
is another reason to doubt wide-scale use of the accountant-informant. As
explained below, there is good reason to believe the supply of accountant-
informants is limited.
B. Civil Liability and Practitioners'Licenses
No matter how shrewd the accountant-informant strategy from the
viewpoint of the Service, the use of accountant-informants will always be
constrained by the willingness of accountants to serve as informants. 140 In
addition to professional disciplinary proceedings, a prime determinant of the
effectiveness of this constraint is potential liability to the client at civil law.
Accountant-informants might be sued on a number of theories, such as fraud,
misrepresentation, or breach of fiduciary duty. Accountant-informants might
find some defenses in misprision statutes, whistleblower statutes, the equitable
defense of unclean hands, or perhaps even sovereign immunity. A detailed
discussion of available theories and defenses, however, is unnecessary and
beyond the scope of this Note. It need only be indicated that informants not
only face uncertainty as to whether they can defend actions against themselves,
but, regardless of ultimate liability, they also face the psychic and nonpsychic
costs of litigation.
An interesting case illustrating the uncertainty faced by informants is Wang
v. Horio.141 Wang involved a financial advisor named Horio who voluntarily
See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECrlVE ACTION 48 (2nd ed. 1971); see also id. at
22-33 (laying out mathmatical framework supporting these propositions).
138 The Rook case apparently prompted such action. See supra note 136; see also
S.2452, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (bill introduced by Senator Armstrong to amend the
Federal Rules of Evidence to establish a tax preparer's privilege); S.1617, 102d Cong., 1st
Seas. (1991) (bill introduced by Senators Symms and D'Amato to amend the tax code to
provide protection for taxpayers).
139 It is probably for this reason that neither the Armstrong nor the Symms/D'Amato
initiatives have been successful. See supra note 138.
140 This Note omits discussion of an additional consideration-the willingness of
Internal Revenue Service agents to use accountant-informants even when authorized to do
so. Presumably the Service incurs some agency costs resulting from the conflicting interests
of its own employees.
141 Wang v. Horio, 741 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1989), rev'd and remanded in
part, Wang v. United States, 947 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir. 1991).
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served as an informant to the Service in the belief that his employers, the
Wangs, were hiding income.142 The Wangs were indicted, but the prosecutor
dismissed the indictment when the court suppressed crucial evidence. 143 The
Wangs then sued Horio on state and federal causes of action. Horio asked the
Attorney General to certify under section 2679(d)(2) of Title 28 that he had
acted within the course and scope of his employment as a government agent.44
The Attorney General, however, refused such certification. 145 Horio then
petitioned the court for such certification under section 2679(d)(3) of Title
28.146 Fortunately for Horio, the lower court found that he was an employee of
the United States because he was subject to the control of the Service. This
finding extinguished several of the plaintiff's causes of action.147 While the
outcome may have seemed predetermined by Horio's classification as a
"controlled" informant, 148 the refusal of the Attorney General to certify Horio
as an employee still demonstrates the risk faced by informants. The ability of
the Service to conveniently sever its links to informants is apparent from the
reward application signed by Horio. The application recited that Horio "was
142 Wang, 741 F. Supp. at 1374.
143 Id.
144 Section 2679(d)(2) provides:
Upon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting
within the scope of his office or employment at the time of which the claim arose, any
civil action or proceeding commenced upon such claim in a State court shall be
removed without bond at any time before trial by the Attorney General to the district
court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place in which the
action or proceeding is pending. Such action shall be deemed to be an action or
proceeding brought against the United States under the provisions of this title and all
references thereto, and the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant.
This certification of the Attorney General shall conclusively establish scope of office or
employment for purposes of removal.
(emphasis added).
145 Wang, 741 F. Supp. at 1375.
146 Section 2679(d)(3) provides in part:
In the event that the Attorney General has refused to certify the scope of office or
employment under this section, the employee may at any time before trial petition the
court to find and certify that the employee was acting within the scope of his office or
employment. Upon such certification by the court, such action or proceeding shall be
deemed to be an action or proceeding brought against the United States under the
provisions of this title and all references thereto, and the United States shall be
substituted as the party defendant.
28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(3) (1988).
147 Wang, 741 F. Supp. at 1379.
148 ld. at 1378.
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not an employee of the Department of Treasury at the time [he] came into
possession of the information or at the time [he] divulged it." 149
As suggested earlier, in addition to potential liability and the costs of
defending suits, accountants considering service as informants must consider
the possibility of professional discipline. Such was the situation with
Checkmate, 150 who lost his license to practice in Missouri. A professional
license is the most valuable asset owned by the typical practitioner, and the risk
of losing it undoubtedly prevents many accountants from serving as informants.
The value of a license, however, varies with the accountant's age and the
success of the accountant's practice. For an accountant in Checkmate's
position, a septuagenarian twenty thousand dollars in debt to the federal
government, 151 this asset promised little future cash flow. Consequently, for
Checkmate the potential cost of losing the license was minimal compared to the
benefits of cooperating with the Service. Few accountants, however, will find
themselves situated in such a precarious position. Thus, the frequency of
Checkmate-type incidents should not be overestimated.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This Note set out to explore the use of accountant-informants and to look
beyond the media hype surrounding that use. It has suggested that the law of
accountant-client privilege is irrelevant in federal, and perhaps even state,
criminal tax prosecutions, but that clients duped by their accountants might
occasionally find refuge in the Fourth Amendment, particularly if the
accountant was retained for purposes far removed from public reporting. In
most cases, however, a Fourth Amendment defense will be tenuous, and other
havens suggested by the defense bar are unavailable. The absence of defenses,
however, should not alarm honest taxpayers. The number of accountant-
informants is unlikely to surge. A game theory-based understanding of the use
of accountant-informants suggests that the Service need only occasionally resort
to their services to further its goal of deterring noncompliance. Moreover, the
benefits of serving as an informant will likely pale beside the actual and
potential costs of doing so. Therefore, the Service will seldom find accountants
willing to serve as informants.
Thus, despite adverse publicity surrounding the use of an accountant-
informant in the Rook case, the enforcement division of the Internal Revenue
Service remains a powerful force. In fact, the adverse publicity strengthened
149 Id.
150 See Geyelan and Pollack, supra note 12.
151 See supra notes 3, 13.
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the Internal Revenue Service: stories involving accountant-informants are good
"bad press."
Charles Q. Jakob
